philebus   

in the past, present, or future?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I

not right?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real

but illusory character?

Pro. How do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real

pleasure; who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be

pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real

existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.

Pro. Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.

Soc. And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like;

are they not often false?

Pro. Quite so.

Soc. And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are

true or false?

Pro. In no other way.

Soc. Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as

they are false.

Pro. Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one

would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by

reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.

Soc. Well, of pleasures which are and caused by corruption we will

hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I

would rather show by another argument that there are many false

pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may

assist our final decision.

Pro. Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.

Soc. I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion

which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.