philebus   

falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of

pleasures and pains?

Pro. Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.

Soc. Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were

saying before.

Pro. What was that?

Soc. Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the

pleasures and pains with their own falsity.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false

because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to

comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement

when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed

side by side with the pleasures.

Pro. Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.

Soc. And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element

which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are:

you will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never

say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is

real or true.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find

pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are

still more false than these.

Pro. What are they, and how shall we find them?

Soc. If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and

aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a

corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and

repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?

Pro. Yes, that has been often said.

Soc. And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural

state is pleasure?