philebus   

Pro. Right.

Soc. But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body

experiences none of these changes.

Pro. When can that be, Socrates?

Soc. Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument.

Pro. Why not, Socrates?

Soc. Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine.

Pro. And what was that?

Soc. Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I

may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?

Pro. You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either

for good or bad?

Soc. Yes.

Pro. Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be

neither pleasure nor pain.

Soc. Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert

that we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise

tell us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.

Pro. Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.

Soc. Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I

should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how

I mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight.

Pro. How?

Soc. To them we will say: "Good; but are we, or living things in

general, always conscious of what happens to us-for example, of our

growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly

unconscious of this and similar phenomena?" You must answer for them.

Pro. The latter alternative is the true one.

Soc. Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions

going up and down cause pleasures and pains?

Pro. True.

Soc. A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-