protagoras   

are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the

whole face.

And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Of if

a man has one part, must he also have all the others?

By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or

just and not wise.

You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts

of virtue?

Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of

the parts.

And they are all different from one another? I said.

Yes.

And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the

face;-the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the

same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another,

either in their functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether

the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also

differ from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that

is clearly what the simile would imply.

Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.

Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like

justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?

No, he answered.

Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their

natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the

nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion: would it not

be yours also?

Mine also, he said.

And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, "O Protagoras, and

you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice,

is it just or unjust?"-and I were to answer, just: would you vote with

me or against me?