protagoras   

With you, he said.

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of

the nature of the just: would not you?

Yes, he said.

And suppose that he went on to say: "Well now, is there also such

a thing as holiness? "we should answer, "Yes," if I am not mistaken?

Yes, he said.

Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing-should we not say so?

He assented.

"And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy,

or of the nature of the unholy?" I should be angry at his putting such

a question, and should say, "Peace, man; nothing can be holy if

holiness is not holy." What would you say? Would you not answer in the

same way?

Certainly, he said.

And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, "What were

you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you

seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same

as one another." I should reply, "You certainly heard that said, but

not, as you imagine, by me; for I only asked the question;

Protagoras gave the answer." And suppose that he turned to you and

said, "Is this true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part

of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?"-how would you

answer him?

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.

Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that

he proceeded to say further, "Then holiness is not of the nature of

justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of

unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and

therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy": how shall we

answer him? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that

justice is holy, and that holiness is just; and I would say in like