protagoras   

He assented.

And we said that everything has only one opposite?

Yes.

Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One

says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is

distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue;

and that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in

themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which

of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together

are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can

they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one

opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has

clearly the two opposites wisdom and temperance? Is not that true,

Protagoras? What else would you say?

He assented, but with great reluctance.

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and

holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras,

I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that

an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this which

nevertheless many may be found to assert.

And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.

I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many

first, if you will.

Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you

are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of

the argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who

answer may both be put on our trial.

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the

argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.

Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think

that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?