republic (books 1 - 5)   

Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their
respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine
gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another
art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts
may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which
they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his
art unless he were paid as well?

I suppose not.

But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for
nothing?

Certainly, he confers a benefit.

Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that
neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests;
but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the
interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the
stronger--to their good they attend and not to the good of the
superior.

And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why,
as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because
no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which
are not his concern, without remuneration. For, in the execu-
tion of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true
artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his
subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to
rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment,
money, or honor, or a penalty for refusing.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two
modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty
is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this pay-
ment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule?
Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be,
as indeed they are, a disgrace?

Very true.

And for this reason, I said, money and honor have no attrac-
tion for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding
payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor
by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get
the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care
about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them,
and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment.
And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to
take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been
deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment
is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is
worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, in-
duces the good to take office, not because they would, but be-
cause they cannot help--not under the idea that they are going
to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity,
and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to
anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For
there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely
of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object
of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should
have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to