republic (books 1 - 5)   

I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.

Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge,
sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but
also for their results?

Certainly, I said.

And would you not recognize a third class, such as gym-
nastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also
the various ways of money-making--these do us good but we
regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them
for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or
result which flows from them?

There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you
would place justice?

In the highest class, I replied--among those goods which
he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and
for the sake of their results.

Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice
is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which
are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation,
but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that
this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just
now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am
too stupid to be convinced by him.

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and
then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus
seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice
sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature
of justice and injustice has not yet been made clear. Setting
aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are
in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If
you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus.
And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice accord-
ing to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that
all men who practise justice do so against their will, of neces-
sity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there
is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better
far than the life of the just--if what they say is true, Socrates,
since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge
that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus
and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other
hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injus-
tice maintained by anyone in a satisfactory way. I want to hear
justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and
you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to
hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the ut-
most of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the
manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and
censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my
proposal?

Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a
man of sense would oftener wish to converse.