sophist   

number of minute particulars, having a variety of names which are
thought ridiculous.
Theaet. Very true.
Str. There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous,
Theaetetus; but then the dialectical art never considers whether the
benefit to be derived from the purge is greater or less than that to
be derived from the sponge, and has not more interest in the one
than in the other; her endeavour is to know what is and is
not kindred
in all arts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence; and
having this in view, she honours them all alike, and when she makes
comparisons, she counts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than
another; nor does she esteem him who adduces as his example of
hunting, the general's art, at all more decorous than another who
cites that of the vermin-destroyer, but only as the greater
pretender of the two. And as to your question concerning the name
which was to comprehend all these arts of purification, whether of
animate or inanimate bodies, the art of dialectic is in no wise
particular about fine words, if she maybe only allowed to have a
general name for all other purifications, binding them up
together and
separating them off from the purification of the soul or intellect.
For this is the purification at which she wants to arrive,
and this we
should understand to be her aim.
Theaet. Yes, I understand; and I agree that there are two sorts of
purification and that one of them is concerned with the
soul, and that
there is another which is concerned with the body.
Str. Excellent; and now listen to what I am going to say,
and try to
divide further the first of the two.
Theaet. Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavour to
assist you.
Str. Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And purification was to leave the good and to cast
out whatever
is bad?
Theaet. True.
Str. Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly
called purification?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.
Theaet. What are they?
Str. The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to
deformity.
Theaet. I do not understand.
Str. Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are
the same.
Theaet. To this, again, I know not what I should reply.
Str. Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred
clements, originating in some disagreement?
Theaet. Just that.
Str. And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is
always unsightly?
Theaet. Exactly.
Str. And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure
to anger, reason to pain, and that all these elements are opposed to
one another in the souls of bad men?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And yet they must all be akin?
Theaet. Of course.
Str. Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and