sophist   

disease of
the soul?
Theaet. Most true.
Str. And when things having motion, an aiming at an appointed
mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that
this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of
symmetry?
Theaet. Clearly of the want of symmetry.
Str. But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of
anything?
Theaet. Certainly not.
Str. And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is
bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is
perverted?
Theaet. True.
Str. Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and
devoid of symmetry?
Theaet. Very true.
Str. Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul-the one
which is generally called vice, and is obviously a disease of the
soul...
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which,
because existing only in the soul, they will not allow to be vice.
Theaet. I certainly admit what I at first disputed-that there are
two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider
cowardice, intemperance, and injustice to be alike forms of
disease in
the soul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of
varieties, to
be deformity.
Str. And in the case of the body are there not two arts, which
have to do with the two bodily states?
Theaet. What are they?
Str. There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and
medicine, which has to do with disease.
Theaet. True.
Str. And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is
not chastisement the art which is most required?
Theaet. That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.
Str. Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction
be rightly said to be the remedy?
Theaet. True.
Str. And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one
or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think.
Theaet. I will.
Str. I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the
answer to this question.
Theaet. How?
Str. If we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two
halves. For a division of ignorance into two parts will certainly
imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, answering to the
two divisions of ignorance.
Theaet. Well, and do you see what you are looking for?
Str. I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of
ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale
against all other sorts of ignorance put together.
Theaet. What is it?
Str. When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know this
appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.
Theaet. True.
Str. And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance
which specially earns the title of stupidity.
Theaet. True.