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sophist   
Str. I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very
closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that
he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all
things, by a single art.
Theaet. All things?
Str. I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter,
for you do not understand the meaning of "all."
Theaet. No, I do not.
Str. Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and
trees.
Theaet. What do you mean?
Str. Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all
creatures.
Theaet. What would he mean by "making"? He cannot be a
husbandman;-for you said that he is a maker of animals.
Str. Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the
earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and,
further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few
pence.
Theaet. That must be a jest.
Str. And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach
them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a
jest?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than
imitation?
Theaet. Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term,
which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.
Str. We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make
all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes
resemblances of real things which have the same name with
them; and he
can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he
shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the
absolute power of making whatever he likes.
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of
reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by
words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance
from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments,
and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is
the wisest of men in all things?
Theaet. Yes; why should there not be another such art?
Str. But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and
come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad
experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater
part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly
entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy
difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the
facts of life?
Theaet. That is my view, as far as I can judge, although,
at my age,
I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.
Str. And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and
always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can
without the
sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether
the Sophist
is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we
still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the
various matters about which he disputes?
Theaet. But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt,
after what has
been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of
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