sophist   

Theaet. And why?
Str. Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my
father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force, that in a certain
sense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not.
Theaet. Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.
Str. Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless
these questions are decided in one way or another, no one when he
speaks false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images or
imitations or appearances, or about the arts which are concerned
with them; can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.
Theaet. Most true.
Str. And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's
argument; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give
the matter up.
Theaet. Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so.
Str. I have a third little request which I wish to make.
Theaet. What is it?
Str. You heard me-say what-I have always felt and still feel-that
I have no heart for this argument?
Theaet. I did.
Str. I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that
you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and
shiftings; let me therefore observe, that I am examining the
question entirely out of regard for you.
Theaet. There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any
impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof; take
heart, therefore, and proceed.
Str. And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that
the road which I must take is-
Theaet. Which?-Let me hear.
Str. I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points
which at present are regard as self-evident, lest we may have fallen
into some confusion, and be too ready to assent to one another,
fancying that we are quite clear about them.
Theaet. Say more distinctly what you mean.
Str. I think that Parmenides, and all ever yet undertook to
determine the number and nature of existences, talked to us in
rather a light and easy strain.
Theaet. How?
Str. As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each his
own mythus or story;-one said that there were three principles, and
that at one time there was war between certain of them; and
then again
there was peace, and they were married and begat children,
and brought
them up; and another spoke of two principles,-a moist and a dry, or
a hot and a cold, and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics,
however, in our part of the world, say that things are many in name,
but in nature one; this is their mythus, which goes back to
Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more
recent times Sicilian muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that
to unite the two principles is safer, and to say that being
is one and
many, and that these are held together by enmity and friendship,
ever parting, ever meeting, as the-severer Muses assert, while the
gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but
admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and unity
sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again
plurality and war, by reason of a principle of strife. Whether any
of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; besides,
antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to
accusations; so serious; Yet one thing may be said of them without
offence-
Theaet. What thing?