sophist   

Str. And there is something which you call "being"?
Theaet. "Yes."
Str. And is being the same as one, and do you apply two
names to the
same thing?
Theaet. What will be their answer, Stranger?
Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the
unity of being
will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.
Theaet. Why so?
Str. To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing
but unity, is surely ridiculous?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?
Theaet. How so?
Str. To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality.
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be
compelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he
says that it
is the name of something, even then the name will only be the name
of a name, and of nothing else.
Theaet. True.
Str. And the one will turn out to be only one of one, and being
absolute unity, will represent a mere name.
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And would they say that the whole is other than the one that
is, or the same with it?
Theaet. To be sure they would, and they actually say so.
Str. If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings,-

Every way like unto the fullness of a well-rounded sphere,
Evenly balanced from the centre on every side,
And must needs be neither greater nor less in any way,
Neither on this side nor on that-

then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also
have parts.
Theaet. True.
Str. Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of
unity in all
the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute
unity?
Theaet. Why not?
Str. Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one
must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible.
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will
contradict
reason.
Theaet. I understand.
Str. Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has
the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at
all?
Theaet. That is a hard alternative to offer.
Str. Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute
of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is
therefore more than one.
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute
of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being
lacks something of its own nature?