sophist   

Theaet. Certainly not.
Str. Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you
say that they are?
Theaet. Of course not.
Str. Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature,
under which rest and motion are alike included; and, observing that
they both participate in being, you declare that they are.
Theaet. Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is
some third
thing, when we say that rest and motion are.
Str. Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but
something different from them.
Theaet. So it would appear.
Str. Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in
motion nor at rest.
Theaet. That is very much the truth.
Str. Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have
any clear
or fixed notion of being in his mind?
Theaet. Where, indeed?
Str. I scarcely think that he can look anywhere; for that which is
not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest
must be in motion; but being is placed outside of both these
classes. Is this possible?
Theaet. Utterly impossible.
Str. Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind.
Theaet. What?
Str. When we were asked to what we were to assign the
appellation of
not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty:-do you remember?
Theaet. To be sure.
Str. And are we not now in as a difficulty about being?
Theaes. I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which is, if
possible, even greater.
Str. Then let us acknowledge the difficulty; and as being and
not-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope
that when
the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally
appear; and if we are able to see neither there may still be a
chance of steering our way in between them, without any great
discredit.
Theaet. Very good.
Str. Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of
the same thing.
Theaet. Give an example.
Str. I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many
names-that
we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and
vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand others we not
only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having number-less
other attributes, and in the same way anything else which we
originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under
many names.
Theaet. That is true.
Str. And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether young or
old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot
be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in
denying that a
man is good; for man, they insist, is man and good is good.
I dare say
that you have met with persons who take-an interest in such
matters-they are often elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown
into amazement by these discoveries of theirs, which they believe to
be the height of wisdom.