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sophist   
Theaet. Certainly, I have.
Str. Then, not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all
upon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well
as to our former friends.
Theaet. What questions?
Str. Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or
anything to anything, and assume that they do not mingle, and are
incapable of participating in one another? Or shall we
gather all into
one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some
things communicable and others not?-Which of these alternatives,
Theaetetus, will they prefer?
Theaet. I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you
take all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are the consequences
which follow from each of them.
Str. Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing
is capable of participating in anything else in any respect; in that
case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all.
Theaet. They cannot.
Str. But would either of them be if not participating in being?
Theaet. No.
Str. Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as
well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also
the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and
everlasting kinds; for all these add on a notion of being, some
affirming that things "are" truly in motion, and others that they
"are" truly at rest.
Theaes. Just so.
Str. Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another
resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one
creating infinity, or dividing them into finite clements, and
forming compounds out of these; whether they suppose the processes
of creation to be successive or continuous, would be talking
nonsense in all this if there were no admixture.
Theaet. True.
Str. Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want to
carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything, because
participating in some affection from another, by the name of that
other.
Theaet. Why so?
Str. Why, because they are compelled to use the words "to be,"
"apart," "from others. "in itself," and ten thousand more, which
they cannot give up, but must make the connecting links of
discourse; and therefore they do not require to be refuted by
others, but their enemy, as the saying is, inhabits the same house
with them; they are always carrying about with them an
adversary, like
the wonderful ventriloquist, Eurycles, who out of their own bellies
audibly contradicts them.
Theaet. Precisely so; a very true and exact illustration.
Str. And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of
communion with one another -what will follow?
Theaet. Even I can solve that riddle.
Str. How?
Theaet. Why, because motion itself would be at rest, and rest
again in motion, if they could be attributed to one another.
Str. But this is utterly impossible.
Theaet. Of course.
Str. Then only the third hypothesis remains.
Theaet. True.
Str. For, surely, either all things have communion with all; or
nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some
things and others not.
Theaet. Certainly.
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