Otho   

Cremona, another large and rich city. In the meantime, Annius Gallus
marched to join Spurina at Placentia; but having intelligence that
the siege was raised, and that Cremona was in danger, he turned to
its relief, and encamped just by the enemy, where he was daily reinforced
by other officers. Caecina placed a strong ambush of heavy infantry
in some rough and woody country, and gave orders to his horse to advance,
and if the enemy should charge them, then to make a slow retreat,
and draw them into the snare. But his stratagem was discovered by
some deserters to Celsus, who attacked with a good body of horse,
but followed the pursuit cautiously, and succeeded in surrounding
and routing the troops in the ambuscade; and if the infantry which
he ordered up from the camp had come soon enough to sustain the horse,
Caecina's whole army, in all appearance, had been totally routed.
But Paulinus, moving too slowly, was accused of acting with a degree
of needless caution not to have been expected from one of his reputation.
So that the soldiers incensed Otho against him, accused him of treachery,
and boasted loudly that the victory had been in their power, and that
if it was not complete, it was owing to the mismanagement of their
generals; all which Otho did not so much believe as he was willing
to appear not to disbelieve. He therefore sent his brother Titianus,
with Proculus, the prefect of the guards, to the army, where the latter
was general in reality, and the former in appearance. Celsus and Paulinus
had the title of friends and counsellors, but not the least authority
or power. At the same time, there was nothing but quarrel and disturbance
amongst the enemy, especially where Valens commanded; for the soldiers
here, being informed of what had happened at the ambuscade, were enraged
because they had not been permitted to be present to strike a blow
in defence of the lives of so many men that had died in that action;
Valens, with much difficulty, quieted their fury, after they had now
begun to throw missiles at him, and quitting his camp, joined Caecina.
About this time, Otho came to Bedriacum, a little town near Cremona,
to the camp, and called a council of war; where Proculus and Titianus
declared for giving battle, while the soldiers were flushed with their
late success, saying they ought not to lose their time and opportunity
and present height of strength, and wait for Vitellius to arrive out
of Gaul. But Paulinus told them that the enemy's whole force was present,
and that there was no body of reserve behind; but that Otho, if he
would not be too precipitate, and chose the enemy's time, instead
of his own, for the battle, might expect reinforcements out of Moesia
and Pannonia, not inferior in numbers to the troops that were already
present. He thought it probable, too, that the soldiers, who were
then in heart before they were joined, would not be less so when the
forces were all come up. Besides, the deferring battle could not be
inconvenient to them that were sufficiently provided with all necessaries;
but the others, being in an enemy's country, must needs be exceedingly
straitened in a little time. Marius Celsus was of Paulinus's opinion;
Annius Gallus, being absent and under the surgeon's hands through
a fall from his horse, was consulted by letter, and advised Otho to
stay for those legions that were marching from Moesia. But after all
he did not follow the advice; and the opinion of those that declared
for a battle prevailed.
There are several reasons given for this determination, but the most
apparent is this; that the praetorian soldiers, as they are called,
who serve as guards, not relishing the military discipline which they
now had begun a little more to experience, and longing for their amusements
and unwarlike life among the shows of Rome, would not be commanded,
but were eager for a battle, imagining that upon the first onset they
should carry all before them. Otho also himself seems not to have
shown the proper fortitude in bearing up against the uncertainty,
and, out of effeminacy and want of use, had not patience for the calculations
of danger, and was so uneasy at the apprehension of it that he shut
his eyes, and like one going to leap from a precipice, left everything
to fortune. This is the account Secundus the rhetorician, who was
his secretary, gave of the matter. But others would tell you that