The Comparison of Crassus with Nicias   

not to give way to the ill-affected, or expose the government to those
that are incapable of it, nor suffer high trusts to be committed to
those who want common honesty. Yet Nicias, by his connivance, raised
Cleon, a fellow remarkable for nothing but his loud voice and brazen
face, to the command of an army. Indeed, I do not commend Crassus,
who in the war with Spartacus was more forward to fight than became
a discreet general, though he was urged into it by a point of honour,
lest Pompey by his coming should rob him of the glory of the action,
as Mummius did Metellus at the taking of Corinth, but Nicias's proceedings
are inexcusable. For he did not yield up a mere opportunity of getting
honour and advantage to his competitor, but believing that the expedition
would be very hazardous, was thankful to take care of himself, and
left the commonwealth to shift for itself. And whereas Themistocles,
lest a mean and incapable fellow should ruin the state by holding
command in the Persian war, bought him off, and Cato, in a most dangerous
and critical conjuncture, stood for the tribuneship for the sake of
his country, Nicias, reserving himself for trifling expeditions against
Minoa and Cythera, and the miserable Melians, if there be occasion
to come to blows with the Lacedaemonians, slips off his general's
cloak and hands over to the unskillfulness and rashness of Cleon,
fleet, men, and arms, and the whole command, where the utmost possible
skill was called for. Such conduct, I say, is not to be thought so
much carelessness of his own fame, as of the interest and preservation
of his country. By this means it came to pass he was compelled to
the Sicilian war, men generally believing that he was so much honestly
convinced of the difficulty of the enterprise, as ready out of mere
love of ease and cowardice to lose the city the conquest of Sicily.
But yet it is a great sign of his integrity, that though he was always
averse from war, and unwilling to command, yet they always continued
to appoint him as the best experienced and ablest general they had.
On the other hand Crassus, though always ambitious of command, never
attained to it, except by mere necessity in the servile war, Pompey
and Metellus and the two brothers Lucullus being absent, although
at that time he was at his highest pitch of interest and reputation.
Even those who thought most of him seem to have thought him, as the
comic poet says-
"A brave man anywhere but in the field." There was no help, however,
for the Romans, against his passion for command and for distinction.
The Athenians sent out Nicias against his will to the war, and Crassus
led out the Romans against theirs; Crassus brought misfortune on Rome,
as Athens brought it on Nicias.
Still this is rather ground for praising Nicias, than for finding
fault with Crassus. His experience and sound judgment as a general
saved him from being carried away by the delusive hopes of his fellow-citizens,
and made him refuse to entertain any prospect of conquering Sicily.
Crassus, on the other hand, mistook, in entering on a Parthian war
as an easy matter. He was eager, while Caesar was subduing the west,
Gaul, Germany, and Britain, to advance for his part to the east and
the Indian Sea, by the conquest of Asia, to complete the incursion
of Pompey and the attempts of Lucullus, men of prudent temper and
of unimpeachable worth, who nevertheless entertained the same projects
as Crassus, and acted under the same convictions. When Pompey was
appointed to the like command, the senate was opposed to it; and after
Caesar had routed three hundred thousand Germans, Cato recommended
that he should be surrendered to the defeated enemy, to expiate in
his own person the guilt of breach of faith. The people, meantime
(their service to Cato!), kept holiday for fifteen days, and were
overjoyed. What would have been their feelings, and how many holidays
would they have celebrated, if Crassus had sent news from Babylon
of victory, and thence marching onward had converted Media and Persia,
the Hyrcanians, Susa and Bactra, into Roman provinces?
If wrong we must do, as Euripides says, and cannot be content with
peace and present good things, let it not be for such results as destroying
Mende or Scandea, or beating up the exiled Aeginetans in the coverts