History of The Peloponnesian War - Book I   

But we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude,
which, since there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not
enemies, and since our friendship does not amount to very frequent
intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture.
When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the
Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with
twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian
question, when we were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to
assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we
acted thus at crises when, if ever, men are wont in their efforts
against their enemies to forget everything for the sake of victory,
regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if thus far he
has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he has
thus far been a friend; indeed they allow their real interests to
suffer from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle.
"Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they
are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have
done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we
say, but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the
straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of
the war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade
you to do wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be
carried away by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of
Corinth. It were, rather, wise to try and counteract the
unfavourable impression which your conduct to Megara has created.
For kindness opportunely shown has a greater power of removing old
grievances than the facts of the case may warrant. And do not be
seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. Abstinence from all
injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength
than anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent
tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn
to benefit by the principle that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that
every power has a right to punish her own allies. We now claim to
receive the same from you, and protest against your rewarding us for
benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the contrary,
return us like for like, remembering that this is that very crisis in
which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes is most a
foe. And for these Corcyraeans- neither receive them into alliance in
our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and you will act
as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best consult
your own interests."
Such were the words of the Corinthians.
When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held.
In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the
representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had
changed and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain
reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance.
It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens
could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth.
But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's
assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of
an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the
Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was
willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed
to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by
mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which
Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval
powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on
the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens
received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the
Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance.
They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus,
the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their
instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet