History of The Peloponnesian War - Book III   

receive them, in so far as they are of use to them, but otherwise
are thought less well of, through being considered traitors to their
former friends. Nor is this an unfair way of judging, where the rebels
and the power from whom they secede are at one in policy and sympathy,
and a match for each other in resources and power, and where no
reasonable ground exists for the rebellion. But with us and the
Athenians this was not the case; and no one need think the worse of us
for revolting from them in danger, after having been honoured by
them in time of peace.
"Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech,
especially as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there
can never be any solid friendship between individuals, or union
between communities that is worth the name, unless the parties be
persuaded of each other's honesty, and be generally congenial the
one to the other; since from difference in feeling springs also
difference in conduct. Between ourselves and the Athenians alliance
began, when you withdrew from the Median War and they remained to
finish the business. But we did not become allies of the Athenians for
the subjugation of the Hellenes, but allies of the Hellenes for
their liberation from the Mede; and as long as the Athenians led us
fairly we followed them loyally; but when we saw them relax their
hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the subjection of the allies,
then our apprehensions began. Unable, however, to unite and defend
themselves, on account of the number of confederates that had votes,
all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians, who
continued to send our contingents as independent and nominally free.
Trust in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel, judging
by the examples already given; it being unlikely that she would reduce
our fellow confederates, and not do the same by us who were left, if
ever she had the power.
"Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith
in their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their
subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would
naturally chafe under this solitary instance of independence as
contrasted with the submission of the majority; particularly as they
daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure
basis of an alliance is for each party to be equally afraid of the
other; he who would like to encroach is then deterred by the
reflection that he will not have odds in his favour. Again, if we were
left independent, it was only because they thought they saw their
way to empire more clearly by specious language and by the paths of
policy than by those of force. Not only were we useful as evidence
that powers who had votes, like themselves, would not, surely, join
them in their expeditions, against their will, without the party
attacked being in the wrong; but the same system also enabled them
to lead the stronger states against the weaker first, and so to
leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural allies, and
less capable of resistance. But if they had begun with us, while all
the states still had their resources under their own control, and
there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation would
have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some
apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or
with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which
we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also
helped us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect
to be able to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out,
from the examples that we had had of their conduct to the rest.
"How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we
had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made
them court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary
basis of confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having
more share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the
first party that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was
certain to break faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being