own capacity. In fine, it is impossible to prevent, and only great
simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once
set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force
whatsoever.

"We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy
through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or
exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of
their error. Consider a moment. At present, if a city that has already
revolted perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms
while it is still able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards.
In the other case, what city, think you, would not prepare better than
is now done, and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it
is all one whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be
otherwise than hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege,
because surrender is out of the question; and if we take the city,
to receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the
revenue which forms our real strength against the enemy? We must
not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own
prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be
enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers of our
dependencies; and we must make up our minds to look for our protection
not to legal terrors but to careful administration. At present we do
exactly the opposite. When a free community, held in subjection by
force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its independence, it
is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to punish it
severely; although the right course with freemen is not to chastise
them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch them before
they rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, and, the
insurrection suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as
possible.
"Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon
recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people
is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or,
if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so
that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your
side. But if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do
with the revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own
motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of
killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the
hands of the higher classes, who when they induce their cities to
rise, will immediately have the people on their side, through your
having announced in advance the same punishment for those who are
guilty and for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were
guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid
alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I consider
it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to
put up with injustice, than to put to death, however justly, those
whom it is our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon's idea that in
punishment the claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied,
facts do not confirm the possibility of such a combination.
"Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without
conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of
which motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon
the plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try
calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to
leave the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and
most terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as
good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of
brute force."
Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed
were the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the
Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a
division, in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the