History of The Peloponnesian War - Book VII   

proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer.
After this both sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing
that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into
line, drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias
did not lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When
Gylippus saw that they did not come on, he led off his army to the
citadel of the quarter of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night
there. On the following day he led out the main body of his army, and,
drawing them up in order of battle before the walls of the Athenians
to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter,
dispatched a strong force against Fort Labdalum, and took it, and
put all whom he found in it to the sword, the place not being within
sight of the Athenians. On the same day an Athenian galley that lay
moored off the harbour was captured by the Syracusans.
After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single
wall, starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae,
in order that the Athenians, unless they could hinder the work,
might be no longer able to invest them. Meanwhile the Athenians,
having now finished their wall down to the sea, had come up to the
heights; and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army
by night and attacked it. However, the Athenians who happened to be
bivouacking outside took the alarm and came out to meet him, upon
seeing which he quickly led his men back again. The Athenians now
built their wall higher, and in future kept guard at this point
themselves, disposing their confederates along the remainder of the
works, at the stations assigned to them. Nicias also determined to
fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory over against the city, which juts out
and narrows the mouth of the Great Harbour. He thought that the
fortification of this place would make it easier to bring in supplies,
as they would be able to carry on their blockade from a less distance,
near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged,
upon every movement of the enemy's navy, to put out against them
from the bottom of the great harbour. Besides this, he now began to
pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing that the coming of
Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. Accordingly, he
conveyed over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in
which he placed most of his baggage, and moored there for the future
the larger craft and men-of-war. This was the first and chief occasion
of the losses which the crews experienced. The water which they used
was scarce and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not
go out for firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse,
who were masters of the country; a third of the enemy's cavalry
being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering
incursions on the part of the Athenians at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile
Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was
approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to
be on the look-out for them about Locris and Rhegium and the
approach to Sicily.
Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using
the stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and
at the same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies,
and formed them in order of battle in front of the lines, the
Athenians forming against him. At last he thought that the moment
was come, and began the attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued
between the lines, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and
the Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up their dead
under truce, while the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus
called the soldiers together, and said that the fault was not theirs
but his; he had kept their lines too much within the works, and had
thus deprived them of the services of their cavalry and darters. He
would now, therefore, lead them on a second time. He begged them to
remember that in material force they would be fully a match for
their opponents, while, with respect to moral advantages, it were
intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians should not feel confident of