History of The Peloponnesian War - Book VII   

overcoming Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that
accompanied them, and of driving them out of the country.
After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again
leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held
the opinion that even if the Syracusans should not wish to offer
battle, it was necessary for them to prevent the building of the cross
wall, as it already almost overlapped the extreme point of their
own, and if it went any further it would from that moment make no
difference whether they fought ever so many successful actions, or
never fought at all. They accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans.
Gylippus led out his heavy infantry further from the fortifications
than on the former occasion, and so joined battle; posting his horse
and darters upon the flank of the Athenians in the open space, where
the works of the two walls terminated. During the engagement the
cavalry attacked and routed the left wing of the Athenians, which
was opposed to them; and the rest of the Athenian army was in
consequence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong within
their lines. The night following the Syracusans carried their wall
up to the Athenian works and passed them, thus putting it out of their
power any longer to stop them, and depriving them, even if
victorious in the field, of all chance of investing the city for the
future.
After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians,
Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed into the harbour under the command
of Erasinides, a Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian ships on
guard, and helped the Syracusans in completing the remainder of the
cross wall. Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise
land and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the cities that
either were lukewarm in the cause or had hitherto kept out of the
war altogether. Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were also dispatched
to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way
that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or in
any other manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were
sending for reinforcements; while the Syracusans proceeded to man a
fleet and to exercise, meaning to try their fortune in this way
also, and generally became exceedingly confident.
Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his
own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had
before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it
especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they
were in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled or
strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He
feared, however, that the messengers, either through inability to
speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the
multitude, might not report the truth, and so thought it best to write
a letter, to ensure that the Athenians should know his own opinion
without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the
real facts of the case.
His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the
requisite verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the
army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid
any unnecessary danger.
At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched
in concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against
Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into the
Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at
Himeraeum.
Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias,
reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted
to them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and
delivered the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and
read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as follows:

"Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many