History of The Peloponnesian War - Book VII   

dolphins suspended from those vessels over the passage. Two of the
Syracusan vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and
were destroyed, one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking
seven of the Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of
the men prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set
up trophies for both the engagements, being now confident of having
a decided superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal
success by land.
CHAPTER XXII.

Nineteenth Year of the War - Arrival of Demosthenes
- Defeat of the Athenians at Epipolae -
Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias

IN the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second
attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with
the succours from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships,
including the foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry,
Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and
barbarian, and slingers and archers and everything else upon a
corresponding scale. The Syracusans and their allies were for the
moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there was to be no
term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification
of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the
power of Athens proving so great in every quarter. On the other
hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain confidence in the
midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood,
felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who by
wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had
allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt,
and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from
Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he
had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match
for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority
until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for
succours, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by
their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on
the first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most
formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in
drawing the utmost profit from the consternation at the moment
inspired by his army; and seeing that the counterwall of the
Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from investing them, was a
single one, and that he who should become master of the way up to
Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty
in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack, made all haste
to attempt the enterprise. This he took to be the shortest way of
ending the war, as he would either succeed and take Syracuse, or would
lead back the armament instead of frittering away the lives of the
Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of the country
at large.
First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of
the Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at
first by land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them
upon either element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters
from the Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the
counterwall first by means of engines. As however the engines that
he brought up were burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and
the rest of the forces repulsed after attacking at many different
points, he determined to delay no longer, and having obtained the
consent of Nicias and his fellow commanders, proceeded to put in
execution his plan of attacking Epipolae. As by day it seemed
impossible to approach and get up without being observed, he ordered
provisions for five days, took all the masons and carpenters, and
other things, such as arrows, and everything else that they could want