History of The Peloponnesian War - Book VII   

that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. For
himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish
under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of
the Athenians, he would rather take his chance and die, if die he
must, a soldier's death at the hand of the enemy. Besides, after
all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. What with
paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified posts, and now for a
full year maintaining a large navy, they were already at a loss and
would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two thousand
talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even ever
so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it,
without ruin to their cause; depending as they did more upon
mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own. He
therefore said that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and not
depart defeated in point of money, in which they were much superior.
Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the
financial distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of
the Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to
raise the siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in
his fleet, and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes,
however, would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said
that if they could not lead off the army without a decree from Athens,
and if they were obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus
or Catana; where their land forces would have a wide extent of country
to overrun, and could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus
do them damage; while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in,
that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy's
favour, a wide sea-room where their science would be of use, and where
they could retreat or advance without being confined or
circumscribed either when they put out or put in. In any case he was
altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and insisted
on removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as
possible; and in this judgment Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however
still objecting, a certain diffidence and hesitation came over them,
with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further information to
make him so positive.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Nineteenth Year of the War - Battles
in the Great Harbour - Retreat and
Annihilation of the Athenian Army

WHILE the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from
where they were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus
had failed to gain Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans
having been driven out while he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was
accompanied not only by a large number of troops raised in Sicily, but
by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the
merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been
carried to Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and
pilots from the Cyrenians, on their voyage alongshore had taken
sides with the Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans who were
besieging them, and from thence coasting on to Neapolis, a
Carthaginian mart, and the nearest point to Sicily, from which it is
only two days' and a night's voyage, there crossed over and came to
Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans prepared to
attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The Athenian
generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and that
their own circumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily
worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of the soldiers, now
began to repent of not having removed before; and Nicias no longer
offering the same opposition, except by urging that there should be no
open voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be