other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar
with our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly.
We had defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans,
against whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now
occupy, when Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained
from Peloponnese and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first
battle with him we were victorious; in the battle on the following day
we were overpowered by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and
compelled to retire within our lines. We have now, therefore, been
forced by the numbers of those opposed to us to discontinue the work
of circumvallation, and to remain inactive; being unable to make use
even of all the force we have, since a large portion of our heavy
infantry is absorbed in the defence of our lines. Meanwhile the
enemy have carried a single wall past our lines, thus making it
impossible for us to invest them in future, until this cross wall be
attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the besieger in
name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged in reality;
as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any
distance into the country.
"Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to
procure reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily,
partly in the hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to
join him in the war, partly of bringing from his allies additional
contingents for the land forces and material for the navy. For I
understand that they contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines
with their land forces and with their fleet by sea. You must none of
you be surprised that I say by sea also. They have discovered that the
length of the time we have now been in commission has rotted our ships
and wasted our crews, and that with the entireness of our crews and
the soundness of our ships the pristine efficiency of our navy has
departed. For it is impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and
careen them, because, the enemy's vessels being as many or more than
our own, we are constantly anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be
seen exercising, and it lies with them to take the initiative; and not
having to maintain a blockade, they have greater facilities for drying
their ships.
"This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of
ships to spare, and were freed from our present necessity of
exhausting all our strength upon the blockade. For it is already
difficult to carry in supplies past Syracuse; and were we to relax our
vigilance in the slightest degree it would become impossible. The
losses which our crews have suffered and still continue to suffer
arise from the following causes. Expeditions for fuel and for
forage, and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our
sailors to be cut off by the Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our
previous superiority emboldens our slaves to desert; our foreign
seamen are impressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against
us, and the strength of the enemy's resistance; such of them as were
pressed into the service take the first opportunity of departing to
their respective cities; such as were originally seduced by the
temptation of high pay, and expected little fighting and large
gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or by availing
themselves of one or other of the various facilities of escape which
the magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in trade
themselves and prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves on
board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency of our
navy.
"Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in
its prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a
ship on her way and keep the rowing in time is small. But by far my
greatest trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am
prevented by the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from
putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have no source
from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many