in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with
citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows
and could only be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished
by throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae
being narrow; and of those who got down safely into the plain,
although many, especially those who belonged to the first armament,
escaped through their better acquaintance with the locality, some of
the newcomers lost their way and wandered over the country, and were
cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed.
The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae
where the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the
first check was given by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back
their dead under truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies
were killed, although still more arms were taken than could be
accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of those who were
obliged to leap down from the cliffs without their shields escaped
with their lives and did not perish like the rest.
After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such
an unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with
fifteen ships to Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if
possible the city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into
the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of
taking the Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair
on Epipolae.
In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster
which had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They
saw themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers
disgusted with their stay; disease being rife among them owing to
its being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and
unhealthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the
state of their affairs generally being thought desperate. Accordingly,
Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but
agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae,
now that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without
further loss of time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and their
late reinforcement might give them the superiority at all events on
that element. He also said that it would be more profitable for the
state to carry on the war against those who were building
fortifications in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was no
longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander
large sums of money to no purpose by going on with the siege.
This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad
state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to
have it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council
were openly voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much
less likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery. Moreover,
his own particular information still gave him reason to hope that
the affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their
own, if the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear
out the Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more
extensive command of the sea now given them by their present navy.
Besides this, there was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the
city to the Athenians, and kept sending him messages and telling him
not to raise the siege. Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting
because he hesitated between the two courses and wished to see his way
more clearly, in his public speech on this occasion he refused to lead
off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians would never approve
of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon
their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like
themselves and not from what they might hear from hostile critics,
would simply be guided by the calumnies of the first clever speaker;
while many, indeed most, of the soldiers on the spot, who now so
loudly proclaimed the danger of their position, when they reached
Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say